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Abstract
Background: Out-of-pocket spending is an important source of healthcare financing even in countries with established
prepaid financing of healthcare. However, out-of-pocket payments (OOPP) may have undesirable effects from an
equity perspective. In this study, we analyse the distributive effects of OOPP in Austria based on cross-sectional
information from the Austrian Household Budget Survey 2009/10.
Methods: We combine evidence from disaggregated measures (concentration curve and Lorenz curve) and summary
indices (Gini coefficient, Kakwani index, and Reynolds–Smolensky index) to demonstrate the distributive effects of total
OOPP and their subcomponents. Thereby, we use different specifications of household ability to pay. We follow the
Aronson–Johnson–Lampert approach and split the distributive effect into its three components: progressivity,
horizontal equity, and reranking.
Results: OOPP in Austria have regressive effects on income distribution. These regressive effects are especially
pronounced for the OOPP category prescription fees and over-the-counter pharmaceuticals. Disaggregated evidence
shows that the effects differ between income groups. The decomposition analysis reveals a high degree of reranking
and horizontal inequity for total OOPP, and particularly, for therapeutic aids and physician services.
Conclusions: The results – especially those for prescription fees and therapeutic aids – are of high relevance for the
recent and on-going discussion on the reform of benefit catalogues and cost-sharing schemes in the public health
insurance system in Austria.
Keywords: Out-of-pocket health expenditure, Healthcare financing inequalities, Kakwani index, Vertical equity,
Horizontal equity, Reranking
JEL Classification: H22, H23, H51, I14
Background
Out-of-pocket payments (OOPP) in the healthcare
sector are substantial. Roughly 40 % of the total global
healthcare bill is financed from this source, and in
several world regions, the OOPP share is as high as
60–70 % [1]. However, even in OECD-countries (Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development) –
mainly countries with well-established prepaid schemes of
health care financing – the share of OOPP in total health-
care spending is close to 20 % (non-weighted OECD aver-
age based on the most recent information) [2]. OOPP are
not only important from a fiscal perspective, they also
have important consequences for economic welfare.
Health expenditure is to a large extent unpredictable from
an individual perspective and reduces funds to consume
other necessities and amenities of life. If individuals or
households were risk averse, they would demand risk-
pooling mechanisms to smooth their consumption paths
against the irregularities caused by bad health, in the
private insurance market and/or in the political arena.
Consequently, the avoidance of OOPP by pooling
health expenditure risks seems to have high potential
for welfare improvement. This is especially true if
OOPP exceed a substantial threshold and/or push the
individual or household below the poverty line [3–7].
In addition, it is well known from the previous empir-
ical literature that major reliance on OOPP is likely to
have a regressive impact on income distribution [4–9].
Finally, OOPP act as a barrier for healthcare use and
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might have negative effects on long-term health sta-
tus, especially for low-income individuals or house-
holds [7, 10–12]. On the other hand, if administrative
costs of prepaid systems are substantial and/or moral
hazard exists, OOPP might improve social welfare [10].
In this study, we focus on the effects of OOPP on
income distribution. This research question is embedded
in the broader context of equity and fairness in the
healthcare sector [3, 11, 12]. Ultimately, any analysis of
whether a healthcare system fulfils the benchmarks of
equity and fairness has to consider healthcare payments
and service utilisation simultaneously. In this study, we
focus only on healthcare payments.
We study the redistributive effects of OOPP for the
Austrian healthcare system. Basically the Austrian
health care system is a two tiered health care system.
The public health insurance system represents the
first tier. Membership in this system is obligatory not
only for wage earners in the public and private sector,
but also for self-employed persons (including farmers)
and individuals receiving a pension from a public
pension fund. Individuals with family ties to obliga-
tory insured persons and without own public insur-
ance coverage obtain free insurance coverage. Overall,
the public health insurance system covers around 99.0
% of the whole population, excluding only marginal
groups. It is mainly financed by income related con-
tributions paid by employers and employees. These
contributions are the sole source of financing public
outpatient care, while public inpatient care is add-
itionally co-financed by the states and the communi-
ties out of taxes. Private health insurance and OOPP
constitute the second tier of the Austrian health care
system. Roughly 35 % of the population has signed con-
tracts with private sickness funds, which predominantly
offer additional coverage to the first tier services and/or
improve the possibility to choose from a broader portfolio
of providers within the system. The range/level of services
financed by the public health insurance system and the
states is fixed in benefit catalogues agreed between pro-
viders and financing institutions. These benefit catalogues
are quite comprehensive and include almost all services
which are state of the art.
Outpatient health care services are supplied by physi-
cians having a contract with the public health insurance
system and by private physicians. Contracted physicians
generate income from fee-for-services and lump-sum-
payments. Their spatial distribution follows a capacity
plan agreed between the public health insurance system
and the chamber of physicians. In contrast to contracted
physicians, their private counterparts are free to choose
their practice location. Their remuneration is fixed in
consultations between the doctor and the patient, mainly
based on a fee-for-service system.
Public inpatient health care services (including out-
patient services of hospitals) are supplied by public
hospitals financed on a DRG-basis (Diagnosis-related-
groups-basis). Private inpatient health care services
are offered by private – non-profit or profit – hospi-
tals and by private departments of public hospitals.
Patients with public health insurance coverage are
basically free to consult public or private health care
providers. While the utilization of public health care ser-
vices is based on a benefit-in-kind-scheme with only
limited cost-sharing elements, treatment costs in the
private sector (i) have to be paid out-of-pocket, (ii) are
born by the private sickness funds and/or (iii) by the
public health insurance. The latter only finances parts of
the services offered by private providers, essentially
based on the benefit catalogue and the remuneration
scheme for public health care institutions. So financing
mode (iii) includes substantial cost sharing for the
patients. Patients with private health insurance normally
pay their providers directly and get their money back on
agreed principles of the insurance treaty. Pharmaceuti-
cals in inpatient care are part of the hospital remuner-
ation within the DRG-system. In the outpatient care
sector a positive list of pharmaceuticals exists which are
paid by the public insurance system.
This study aims to analyze the distributive effects of
OOPP in Austria. For the empirical analysis we use
cross-sectional information on OOPP derived from the
Austrian Household Budget Survey 2009/10 [13–15]. To
measure the redistributive effects of OOPP, we apply
different and complementary concepts [16–19] as
follows: (i) disaggregated measures (concentration
curve and Lorenz curve), (ii) summary indices (Gini
coefficient, Kakwani index, and the Reynolds–Smolensky
index) augmented by the Aronson–Johnson–Lampert
approach [16], which splits redistributive effects into the
following components: progressivity, horizontal equity,
and reranking.
Methods and data analysis
Definitions
Any evaluation of the redistributive effect of OOPP
needs a working definition of OOPP and a bench-
mark to classify redistributive effects [7, 11, 12].
OOPP are expenditures on healthcare services by in-
dividuals (households) in the form of payments to
healthcare providers (and sometimes to prepaid plans)
net of reimbursement by prepaid plans. In contrast to
financial contributions to prepaid financing schemes,
OOPP are connected directly with the actual utilisa-
tion of healthcare services. OOPP create a ‘quid pro
quo’ relationship between payment and the utilisation
of healthcare services. We are able to define three
types of OOPP as follows:
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 Type 1: an individual is not covered by a prepaid
plan at all and has to pay the total healthcare bill
directly in the case of healthcare service utilisation
(breadth of the prepaid plan)
 Type 2: although a prepaid plan exists, parts of the
healthcare services offered by healthcare providers
are excluded and have to be paid out of pocket
(depth of the prepaid plan)
 Type 3: healthcare services are included in the
prepaid plan, but the costs are not financed
completely by the prepaid plan (height of the
prepaid plan).
Type 3 covers different forms of partial cost sharing
(proportional and absolute cost sharing and public
subsidies) while type 2 refers to a product- or service-
related cost sharing of 100 %. As far as the Austrian case
is concerned, only the OOPP types 2 and 3 are of empir-
ical relevance in our study. Approximately 99 % of the
Austrian population relies on public health insurance
coverage and we do not expect that the remaining 1 %
of the Austrian population without public health insur-
ance coverage to be part of our household sample.
Owing to our expectation that OOPP of types 2 and 3
have to be judged differently from a distributional
perspective, we discuss the affinity of the single categor-
ies of OOPP separated in the study with the OOPP types
2 and 3 later on in the Discussion section.
Commentators on the healthcare system widely agree
that every healthcare financing system has to fulfil stan-
dards of fairness [7, 11, 12]. In this context, the following
three dimensions of fairness are important [3, 12]: (i)
avoiding catastrophic payments by individuals or house-
holds [3], (ii) horizontal equity, and (iii) vertical equity.
Our study does not consider dimension (i)1 [3] and
concentrates on dimensions (ii) and (iii). Different forms
and schedules of financial contributions may have differ-
ent effects on access to healthcare services, their out-
comes, and finally health status. In the following, we
suppress this ‘instrumental role’ of healthcare financing
as a separate issue and concentrate on the fairness of
financial contributions as an intrinsic goal of the health-
care system [3, 12]. We are aware of the fact that this
approach is especially controversial in the case of OOPP
(see the discussion section). Thus, the rule that individ-
uals and households should contribute to healthcare
according to their ability to pay (ATP) is the starting
point of our equity analysis of OOPP. Thereby, the
principle of ATP includes the two dimensions of hori-
zontal and vertical equity [3, 5, 7, 16, 17]. Horizontal
equity means that individuals and/or households with an
equal ATP contribute the same amount of money to the
healthcare system [5]. Horizontal equity is not just a
formal principle which is easy to accomplish; it also
involves the definition of equality and the identification
of the ‘equals’ [16–18]. Vertical equity defines a rule for
the contribution of individuals and/or households with
unequal ATP [16]. In the following, the principle of
vertical equity is operationalised by the rule of ‘propor-
tionality’, which means that the share of ATP contrib-
uted to the healthcare sector should be the same for all
ATP levels [3].
Statistical concepts of distributive effects
To exploit the informational content of the OOPP- and
ATP-distributions efficiently, we combine disaggregated
and aggregated measures to evaluate the redistributive
effects of OOPP. Disaggregated evidence, which allows
differentiated assessments across different ATP groups is
presented graphically by comparing the Lorenz curve of
ATP and the concentration curves for total OOPP and
different OOPP categories [20]. Aggregated evidence is
based on (i) the Gini coefficient for ATP, (ii) the Kakwani
index [17] for total OOPP and OOPP categories, and (iii)
the Reynolds–Smolensky index [18] for the overall
redistributive effect of OOPP on the ATP distribution.
Thereby, the Kakwani index K is defined in the following
way [20]:
K ¼ COOPP−GATP ð1Þ
where COOPP is the concentration index for total
OOPP and its different subcategories and GATP is the
Gini coefficient for ATP before subtracting OOPP






where t is the OOPP share on sample average (OOPP/
pre-OOPP ATP). Thus, the size of the Reynolds-
Smolensky index measuring the redistributive effect of
OOPP depends on K and the OOPP share. To measure
ATP, we use two versions: ATP I, which represents
household net income as reported by Statistik Austria,
and ATP II, which adjusts for the fact that ATP should
reflect free disposable household income after subtract-
ing expenditure for the basic necessities of life (exclud-
ing OOPP). The literature [3] offers a broad discussion
of adequate indicators for this expenditure. We opt to
derive ATP II by subtracting the monetary value of ben-
efits from the means-tested income maintenance pro-
gram in Austria from ATP I (2010 monthly values: 744 €
for a single individual; 1.108 € for a couple; 134 € for
every child).2 Both versions of ATP and all forms of
OOPP are adjusted by an equivalence scale. We use the
equivalence scale provided by Statistik Austria [13, 14],
in which the first adult (age >14 years) receives a value
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of 1, additional adults a value of 0.5, and every child
(age ≤14 years) a value of 0.3.
The overall redistributive effect of OOPP on ATP –
measured by the Reynolds–Smolenski index – not only
depends on the vertical effect of OOPP on ATP, but also
includes any horizontal inequity associated with the
financing mechanism and the extent of any reranking
resulting therefrom. Aronson, Johnson, and Lampert [16]
worked out that we are only allowed to associate the redis-
tributive effect of OOPP with the vertical dimension of re-
distribution if individuals with the same ATP pay the
same contribution and the financing mechanism does not
change the ordering of the ATP distribution, that is, if
reranking does not exist. Aronson, Johnson, and Lampert
offer a method to split redistributive effects, RE, into its
three components, namely, vertical redistribution,V, hori-
zontal inequity, H, and reranking, R. They define RE as:








αATP GF ATPð Þ
R ¼ GATP−OOPP−CATP−OOPP
The precondition for this separation procedure is to
divide the households into groups of equals in their pre-
OOPP ATP. [3, 20]. We group our sample into 50
groups of pre-OOPP ATP equals by using an equal
bandwidth. We split RE into the horizontal inequality
component H. This captures the differences resulting
from OOPP for the various groups of pre-OOPP ATP
equals. Inequality in the post-OOPP ATP (ATP – OOPP)
is measured in each group of pre-OOPP ATP equals by
the Gini coefficient GF(ATP). Using αATP as weights, a
weighted sum of the Gini coefficients is calculated as
the product of the household share and post-OOPP
ATP share of households with a given pre-OOPP ATP
[20]. V shows the level of ATP redistribution caused by
the fact that, on average, households at different points
in the ATP distribution pay different amounts of
OOPP. Finally, the term R captures the movements of
the households along the ATP distribution (reordering
of the ATP distribution) in the transition from the pre-
OOPP ATP distribution to the post-OOPP ATP distri-
bution. R is measured by the difference between the
Gini coefficient for post-OOPP ATP and the concentra-
tion index for post-OOPP ATP where, in the latter case,
households are ranked by the pre-OOPP ATP [20]. The
calculation of the different distributive effects was done
in STATA 12.1 and closely follows the procedures
proposed by O’Donnel et al. [20].
Data
Data collection
To reveal the distributional effects of OOPP in Austria,
we use data from the Household Budget Survey 2009/10
conducted by the National Statistical Service Office,
Statistik Austria [13–15]. The observation unit is the
private household without institutionalised households
(hospitals, long-term care, and jail). The total sample
offered by Statistics Austria consists of 6,534 households
with 15,540 household members. The exclusion of 510
households with undefined or unclear household struc-
tures resulted in a final sample size of 6,024 households.
Information on consumer behaviour is gathered in two
ways: (i) the diary approach (observation period of
2 weeks) and (ii) the recall approach (observation period
of 1 year). The recall approach is used for consumer
durables and irregular/seasonal expenditure within the
last 12 months. Important socio-economic characteris-
tics of the household (e.g. family structure, age, house-
hold income) are gathered from face-to-face interviews.
Analysed OOPP-categories
We opt to study the redistributive effects of OOPP for
total OOPP and for four important categories of OOPP.
These categories are:
 Prescription fees. Pharmaceuticals, which are part
of outpatient treatments provided by GPs/
specialists who have contracts with the public
health insurance system, are essentially free for
the patient if they are included in the positive list
of the Reimbursement Code of the public health
insurance system.3 Each patient has to pay a
prescription fee for every pharmaceutical
prescribed. This prescription fee is an absolute
amount of money (2009: 4.90 €; 2010: 5.00 €)
with no link to the price of the pharmaceutical.4
Two schemes influence the financial burden of
households and are, therefore, important for
distributive considerations. There is an exemption
from the prescription fee.5 Since 2008, this
exemption is accompanied by a prescription fee
cap at a 2 % share of annual net household
income. Prescription fees of the Austrian type
belong to the type 3 OOPP (see definitions).
From an economic viewpoint, they amount to a
specific tax per prescription, which has to be paid
when consuming pharmaceuticals within a publicly
provided or financed outpatient healthcare treatment.6
 Over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceuticals. This type
of OOPP occurs under two circumstances: (i) if
patients rely on self-medication and (ii) if patients
rely on the professional healthcare system, but the
pharmaceuticals prescribed during medical
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treatments are not listed in the Reimbursement
Code of the public health insurance and are not
refunded by the private health insurance system.7
OTC pharmaceuticals belong to type 2 OOPP.
 Therapeutic aids. These include a heterogeneous
package of medical resources (e.g. glasses, lenses,
crowns, and bridges). When patients need
therapeutic aids within publicly provided or financed
healthcare services, they are confronted with
different schedules of substantial cost sharing
(proportional cost sharing, absolute cost sharing,
and price subsidies). To a minor extent, OOPP for
therapeutic aids result from utilising the private
healthcare sector. In summary, consumption of
therapeutic aids leads to type 2 or 3 OOPP.
 Physician services. This category includes physician
services in the inpatient and outpatient sectors,
including dental services. OOPP for physician
services are either type 2 or 3. Farmers, employers,
and public workers (including their relatives, this
amounts to approximately 20 % of the Austrian
population) face proportional cost sharing of 20 %
for physician services (type 2 OOPP). If patients
consume services in the private healthcare sector, they
have to pay the full price. If the services are covered by
public or private prepaid plans, they receive a share of
the money back (type 2 or 3 OOPP).
Summary statistics
We demonstrate the significance of OOPP in Austria
by using two indicators: (i) OOPP per capita (in PPP/
US$) and (ii) OOPP as a share of total healthcare
expenditure. In an international comparison, both in-
dicators show a high degree of heterogeneity between
OECD-countries [2]. The unweighted OECD average
in 2012 is 560 US$ on indicator (i) and 18.5 % on in-
dicator (ii). The values for Austria are slightly higher
than the average for indicator (i) and slightly lower
than the average for indicator (ii). In a time-series
perspective covering the period since 1995, the share
of OOPP on total healthcare expenditure in Austria is
remarkably stable. OOPP account for approximately
75 % of all private health expenditure, leaving 25 %
accounted for by private health insurance. In addition,
we observe high stability for the share of total private
consumption spend for health purposes. Based on the
ESVG-1995 classification, Austrian households currently
spend on average 3.5 % of total private consumption ex-
penditure on healthcare goods and services [14].
Table 1 shows the total amount of OOPP and the
OOPP for different categories based on information
from the Austrian Household Budget Survey 2009/10.
The first two columns show the average expenditure
per month and the expenditure structure for the total
sample of households. Column 3 reveals the average
expenditure for households with OOPP > 0. Column 4
shows the number of households with OOPP > 0 in each
expenditure category. The last column shows the expend-
iture structure for total health expenditure (including all
sources of healthcare financing). Table 1 reveals the very
specific expenditure structure of OOPP. The most import-
ant OOPP category is therapeutic aids, with 44 % of total
OOPP. On the other hand, 17 % of OOPP are spent on
pharmaceuticals, either directly (OTC pharmaceuticals) or
indirectly, via payment of the prescription fee in the public
health insurance system. Physician services (including in-
patient, outpatient, and dental services) account for 26 %
of OOPP. The expenditure structure of OOPP differs
sharply from the structure of total health expenditure.
This is especially obvious for physician services (26.55 %
vs. 71 %) and therapeutic aids (44.28 % vs. 5 %). In
addition, Table 1 shows the number of households with
OOPP > 0 in the observed period and the average expend-
iture per household. As expected, we observe that the
share of households without OOPP for physician services
is comparably high within the observation period of
2 weeks. The comparison of the average values in columns
1 and 3 reveals the specific characteristics of the OOPP
data: skewness, excess zeros, and heavy right tails.
Results
Results of disaggregated measures
Figure 1 provides disaggregated information on the re-
distributive effect of total OOPP and OOPP categories
by comparing the Lorenz curve of pre-OOPP ATP and
the concentration curves of total OOPP and of several
OOPP categories.8 The basis of the figures are grouped
data of the households: 20 groups of equal size (each
group covers 301 or 302 households) ordered by the
ATP level. Every household is included with identical
weight independently of its size.9 The left-hand side of
Fig. 1 shows the Lorenz curve for ATP I , and the right-
hand side shows the Lorenz curve for ATP II. We have
to be aware that the two concepts of ATP do not only
affect the Lorenz curve of ATP, but also the concentra-
tion curves of OOPP as they might change the ATP
ranking of the households.
Related to ATP I, we observe a regressive effect of
total OOPP in all ATP brackets. This regressive effect is
very pronounced for prescription fees, especially in the
upper ATP brackets. However, in the lower ATP parts,
prescription fees also display pro-rich effects. This con-
trasts to the fact that there are income-related exlusions
and limitations for the prescription fees. The concentra-
tion curve for OTC pharmaceuticals seems to dominate
the concentration curve for prescription fees, at least in
the upper parts of the ATP brackets. The regressive
effects of OOPP for physician services and therapeutic
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aids are lower compared to OOPP for pharmaceuticals.
If we relate the OOPP to ATP II, the redistributive
effects are even more pronounced, especially for total
OOPP and the components of physician services and
therapeutic aids.
Results of aggregated measures
Table 2 presents the distributive effects by using aggre-
gated measures. In the upper part of the table, we
present the results for ATP I, and in the lower part, we
present the results for ATP II. The Gini coefficient for
ATP I is 0.245.10 The concentration index for all OOPP
categories is substantially lower compared to the Gini
coefficient. This results in a regressive effect of OOPP.
The negative sign of the Kakwani index confirms this
statement. It is remarkable that the negative redistribu-
tive effect of the prescription fees is higher compared to
OTC pharmaceuticals. Because total OOPP and its com-
ponents depict only a modest share of ATP I, the overall
regressive effect on ATP I measured by the Reynold–Smo-
lensky index is moderate. The results for ATP II confirm
the empirical picture for ATP I, but the regressive effect is
even more pronounced, which is indicated by the remark-
able increase in the Kakwani index. This is generated
mainly by the doubling of the Gini coefficient. As a result,
the regressive effect on ATP II measured by the Reynold–
Smolensky index also increases substantially.
Table 3 presents the decomposition of the redistribu-
tive effect RE in Austria for total OOPP and the four
OOOP categories into the three components V, H, and
R for ATP I (upper part of the table) and ATP II (lower
part of the table). The results are based on ungrouped
data.11 Thus, the coefficients and indices are slightly
different compared with the grouped case (see Table 2).
RE is captured by the Reynolds–Smolensky index.
Table 3 shows the absolute values for RE, V, H, R, and
the percentage decomposition of the components (base-
line: RE = 100 %). The overall negative redistributive
effect RE is higher in the ATP II case compared to the
ATP I case. For ATP I, the negative vertical effect
explains 50 % of the overall redistribution of total OOPP,
leaving 17 % to horizontal inequality and 33 % to reran-
king. The results for the decomposition of total OOPP
mask pronounced differences between the results for the
different components. Approximately 90 % of the nega-
tive redistributive effect of OOPP for pharmaceuticals
(prescription fees and OTC pharmaceuticals) turns out
to be a distribution in favour of households with a high
ATP. The values for therapeutic aids and physician
services differ substantially. Horizontal inequity and
reranking is much more pronounced for these OOPP
categories. The high number of households without
expenditure on therapeutic aids and physician services
(see Table 1) and the high degree of randomness of these
expenditure categories lead to a high level of reranking
and horizontal inequity. For ATP II, the results differ in
size, but they confirm the direction of results for ATP I.
Overall our results indicate that OOPP are regres-
sive. This result holds for both the disaggregated and
aggregated perspectives, for total OOPP, and for the
different OOPP category prescription fee, OTC phar-
maceuticals, therapeutic aids, and physician services.
The disaggregated evidence reveals that the results
differ between different income brackets. This is espe-
cially pronounced for prescription fees and physician
services. The decomposition analysis reveals a high
degree of reranking and horizontal inequity for total
OOPP and particularly, for therapeutic aids and phys-
ician services.
Discussion
Our study builds on previous research on the redistribu-
tive effects of state financing by taxes in general [16–19]
and of different financing instruments in the healthcare
sector (tax, social health insurance contribution, private
health insurance premium, and OOPP) [5–9, 20–25].
The study contributes to the empirical research on the
redistributive effects of OOPP in several ways. First, it
takes the perspective of households and supplements
the findings available at the individual level. Second,
we use data from a healthcare system which is based
on Bismarckian principals and which holds a specific
Table 1 Expenditure for total OOPP and OOPP categories
Expenditure Total households (HH) HH with expenditure > 0 Total health expenditure
Categories Average exp. Percentage Average exp. Number of HH Percentage
Prescription fee 6.79 6.59 34.59 1,183 −b)
OTC pharmaceuticals 10.88 10.55 41.08 1,596 13.00
Therapeutic aids 44.28 42.96 86.04 3,100 5.00
Physician servicesa 26.55 25.76 207.42 771 71.00
Other expenditure 14.58 14.14 54.12 1,623 11.00
Total OOPP 103.08 100.00 136.68 4,543 100.00
aIncludes inpatient and outpatient physician services as well as dental services
bPrescription fees are not a health expenditure category in this expenditure classification. The source for the last column is [31]
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two-tiered institutional architecture of healthcare ser-
vice provision and financing. Empirical results for
Austria are missing in previous (cross-national) studies,
which focused on the distributional effects of different
forms of healthcare financing [4–6]. Finally, we distinguish
between the most important forms of OOPP and accom-
modate for the internal heterogeneity of this financing
source. This allows us deeper insights into the distribu-
tional effects of the single components of OOPP and the
overall effects.
Fig. 1 Lorenz curve of pre-OOPP ATP and concentration curves of total OOPP and OOPP categories a) ATP-I b) ATP-II
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Table 3 Decomposition of the redistributive impact of OOPP in Austria
ATP Total OOPP Prescription fees OTC pharmaceuticals Therapeutical aids Physician services
ATP I
Gini coefficient 0.2469 - - - - -
RE −0.0121 −0.0009 −0.0010 −0.0038 −0.0037
V −0.0060 −0.0008 −0.0009 −0.0019 −0.0012
H 0.0021 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008
R 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.0017
Decomposition (in %)
RE (baseline) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
V 0.50 0.89 0.90 0.52 0.33
H −0.17 −0.09 −0.08 −0.21 −0.21
R −0.33 −0.02 −0.02 −0.28 −0.46
ATP II
Gini coefficient 0.5108 - - - - -
RE −0.0770 −0.0042 −0.0067 −0.0278 −0.0211
V −0.0595 −0.0039 −0.0061 −0.0227 −0.0142
H 0.0089 0.0003 0.0005 0.0024 0.0041
R 0.0086 0.0000 0.0001 0.0026 0.0029
Decomposition (in %)
RE (baseline) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
V 0.77 0.93 0.91 0.82 0.67
H −0.12 −0.07 −0.07 −0.09 −0.20
R −0.11 −0.00 −0.02 −0.09 −0.13
ATP ability to pay, ATP I ability to pay indicated by household net income, ATP II ability to pay indicated by household net income minus benefits from the income
maintenance program, RE redistributive effect, V vertical distribution, H horizontal inequity, R reranking, OOPP out-of-pocket payment, OTC over the counter
Table 2 Aggregated measures of the distributive effect of total OOPP and OOPP categories
Total OOPP Prescription fees OTC pharmaceuticals Therapeutical aids Physician services
ATP I
Gini coefficient 0.245 - - - - -
Concentration index - 0.138 0.036 0.089 0.162 0.152
Kakwani index - −0.107 −0.209 −0.156 −0.083 −0.092
t = OOPP/ATP I 0.054 0.004 0.006 0.023 0.014
Reynolds–Smolensky index - −0.006 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
ATP II
Gini coefficient 0.538 - - - - -
Concentration index - 0.093 0.044 0.045 0.109 0.086
Kakwani index - −0.445 −0.494 −0.492 −0.429 −0.452
t = OOPP/ATP II - 0.121 0.008 0.013 0.052 0.031
Reynolds–Smolensky index - −0.061 −0.004 −0.006 −0.024 −0.015
ATP I ability to pay indicated by household net income, ATP II ability to pay indicated by household net income minus benefits from the income maintenance
program, OOPP out-of-pocket payment, OTC over the counter, t share of OOPP on ATP I respectively ATP II
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In the following Discussion section we compare our
results with previous empirical evidence and point to
several open questions and limitations of our study. We
also draw selected conclusions for health policy. Our
results are in line with the empirical findings of the
negative redistributive effect of OOPP in the previous
literature. In a seminal cross-country study of 13 OECD
countries, Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer find Kakwani
indices for OOPP ranging from −0.037 (the Netherlands)
to −0.387 (the US), with an unweighted average of the
Kakwani index of −0.21 [7]. Owing to the specific
income definition of ATP II, in our study, only the result
for ATP I (−0.138) is comparable with the results of
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer. In a literature review, Yu,
Whynes, and Sach [21] present a slightly fuller picture
of 18 countries, including the results of the cross-
national study of Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer [7].
They report regressive effects for the US, Switzerland,
Colombia, France, Croatia, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal,
Sweden, the UK, Finland, Spain, Australia, and Ireland
(Kakwani index < −0.1), mildly regressive effects for
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands (Kakwani index
between 0 and −0.1) and strongly progressive effects for
Sri Lanka (Kakwani index: 0.548) [21]. Unfortunately, the
statistical basis for this evidence is rather old. In a more
recent study for Australia covering 1975–2003, Hajiuza-
beh, Connelly, and Butler find Kakwani indices for OOPP
in a similar range to Austria (between −0.0975 in 2003–
2004 and −0.192 in 1988–1989) [9]. For Hungary, Baji,
Pavlova, Gulácsi, and Groot estimate a Kakwani index for
total OOPP of −0.22 in 2005–2008 [22]. For Ireland,
Smith finds a regressive effect of OOPP of increasing size
of the Kakwani index over 1987–2004 (1987–1988: −0.05;
1999–2000: −0.10; 2004–2005: −0.11) [24]. The empirical
evidence on single OOPP categories is very scarce [24],
while the used OOPP categories in [24] are hardly
comparable with the classification categories used in
our study. The same scarce picture applies to the de-
composition of the redistributive effects into V, R, and
H. For the Netherlands, Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer
reveal components for total OOPP of the following size:
V = 61.7 %; H = −11.3 %; and R = −27.0 % [5].
We have already mentioned several controversial
issues (section 2) in our study, which are specific to the
expenditure category OOPP. The concept of “equity” in
healthcare financing used in our study follows the ATP
approach widely favoured in the empirical literature.
This approach has the advantage of allowing compari-
sons of OOPP with other forms of healthcare financing,
particularly prepaid forms. However, this approach
neglects the ‘quid pro quo’ relationship present in
different categories of OOPP financing. It could be ar-
gued that redistributive considerations should take into
account whether OOPP is the result of, on one hand,
need-based medical treatment that is, in principle,
publicly provided and financed, and which offers a stan-
dardised package of health care services (type 3 OOPP)
or, on the other hand, part of the services of the private
healthcare sector, which mainly complements the public
healthcare sector (type 2 OOPP) on a voluntary basis.
We would clearly favour the ATP approach in the first
case and the fiscal equivalence approach in the second
case. Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut separation
between the public healthcare sector and the private
healthcare sector in Austria, but tentative conclusions
are possible (see our description of the Austrian health
care system in section 1) . The prescription fees and
therapeutic aids have a strong affinity to publicly orga-
nised medical treatment while the OTC pharmaceuticals
and physician services12 are strongly linked with private
healthcare provision. For health policy implications, it
seems to be remarkable that the OOPP category pre-
scription fee shows the highest regressive effect and
that owing to the high share of OOPP for therapeutic
aids (43 % of total OOPP), the negative redistributive
effect – measured by the Reynold–Smolensky index – is
highest. Recently, Austria’s health policy reacted to the
latter case and reduced the cost sharing for therapeutic
aids in dentistry.
As in other studies on the inequality of OOPP, the
information on OOPP is based on survey data and,
therefore, may be subject to potential bias typical of the
survey method. As reported, information on consumer
behaviour is gathered in two ways via the diary and
recall approaches. The diary system covers 2 weeks and
results in 1 year of bookkeeping, which allows the repre-
sentation of seasonal patterns and specific consumption
periods (e.g. waves of influenza). The recall approach is
used for consumer durables and irregular or seasonal
expenditure within the last 12 months. In addition, in
general, households are asked for expenses greater than
300 € in the last year using the recall method. As far as
our OOPP categories are concerned, only information
on therapeutic aids in ophthalmology and dentistry is
collected by the recall method. Overall, high data quality
is ensured via the prevailing of the diary system and the
level of instructions for the participants. Potential under-
reporting of the expenditure level of OOPP is reduced
by the use of a disaggregated approach that asks for
several OOPP categories.
On the other hand, the short observation period of
2 weeks used in the diary approach is a matter of con-
cern. Shorrocks shows under quite general conditions
that income inequality and the income accounting
period are related negatively [26]. Owing to the specific
character of health expenditure, this finding also applies
at a progressive rate to the relationship of inequality in
expenditure and the expenditure accounting period in
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the healthcare sector. The results in Table 1 are a clear
indication of this finding. The consequences of the
observation period are mixed. First, different acounting
periods apply for the different OOPP categories and the
ATP, which might influence the observed degree of
inequality. Second, as far as the assessment is based on
grouped data (Fig. 1 and Table 2), we rely on ATP
bracket averages. Bias in this context occur primarily if
these averages are sensitive to the length of the account-
ing period. Third, the problem is serious if the estima-
tion of the distributive effects is based on ungrouped
data. This is particularly relevant for the decomposition
case into the components V, R, and H.
To substantiate this requires a broader discussion of
the decomposition exercise for OOPP data. The decom-
position method was derived first for the tax case [16]. If
individual/households face the same (income) tax sched-
ule and the tax basis exactly represents ATP, then R and
H are zero. If taxation only follows ATP on average, or if
taxation systematically neglects ATP, then R and H are
positive, that is, violations of horizontal equity and
reranking occur. This clearly means that in both the tax
case and publicly prepaid schemes of healthcare finan-
cing via taxes or income-related public insurance contri-
butions, the existence of R and H is to a high degree a
matter of political design and information asymmetry
between the financing institution and the payer. How-
ever, in the case of OOPP, H and R require a different
interpretation. OOPP are not related systematically to
ATP, and so, values of H and R that do not equal zero
will be normal. They occur primarily because healthcare
utilisation and, consequently, the existence and level of
OOPP, are random on the individual and household
level and are based on systematic risks (e.g. age, educa-
tion, consumption behaviour, and family size). Only to a
very limited extent are H and R for OOPP open to
political design (e.g. by ATP-related limitations of cost
sharing). Consequently, we would expect that H and R
for OOPP are much higher compared with prepaid
financing. The opposite is true for V. In the decompos-
ition exercise for the Netherlands, Wagstaff and Van
Doorslaer clearly confirm this expectation (V for direct
taxation: 100.2 %, V for indirect taxation: 99.7 %, V for
sickness fund contributions: 90.4 %,V for OOPP: 61.7 %)
[5]. It is well documented that the decomposition results
depend on the definition of the groups of pre-OOPP
equals [25]. The decomposition exercise is based on
ungrouped data. If the inequality of OOPP between
households depends on the accounting period, the de-
composition results would also depend on the account-
ing period. We would expect relatively lower values for
H and R if the accounting period were extended.
Our analysis focuses on OOPP only. We find that the
effect is clearly regressive. However, the share of OOPP
on household income is low – on average, 3.5 % of ATP
I – and so, the negative effect on the ATP distribution
measured by the Reynolds–Smolenski index is limited.
For several reasons, our dataset is not suitable to study
the redistributive effects of other financing sources
(taxation, public health insurance, and private health
insurance) of the Austrian healthcare system. However,
we can use recent empirical evidence from other studies
to complete the picture. Guger et al. analyse the redis-
tributive effect of public financing in Austria in general
[27] and find a neutral effect of taxation on the ATP
distribution. Thereby, the progressive effect of direct
taxation is compensated by the regressive effect of indir-
ect taxation. The contributions to public health insur-
ance show a clear regressive effect. The contribution
rate is proportional to income and is combined with a
maximum contribution basis. In addition, the contribu-
tions to the public health insurance are tax deductible
and owing to the progressive scheme of the income tax,
the regressive effect increases [28]. Finally the contribu-
tion basis includes only parts of the individual ATP,
mainly earned income from employers and employees,
excluding capital income. This also aggravates the nega-
tive distributive impact. This additional information
from other financing sources clearly shows that health-
care financing in Austria is clearly regressive overall.
Conclusions
This study aimed to assess the redistributive effects of
healthcare financing via OOPP in Austria. Disaggregated
and aggregated measures were used to estimate the
effect of household income distribution. The study used
cross-sectional information on OOPP and income from
the latest Austrian Household Budget Survey in 2009/10.
The study focused on the financing side of OOPP and
excluded the simultanous consideration of financing and
utilisation. Our results indicate that OOPP are clearly
regressive. The disaggregated evidence reveals that the
results differ between different income brackets. This is
especially pronounced for prescription fees and physician
services. The decomposition analysis reveals a high degree
of reranking and horizontal inequity. However, we should
be aware that the decomposition exercise has a specific
meaning in the OOPP case. The results, especially those
for prescription fees and therapeutic aids, are of high rele-
vance for recent and on-going discussions in Austria on
the reform of benefit catalogues and cost-sharing schemes
in the public health insurance system.
Endnotes
1Our calculations show that owing to the compre-
hensive level of public healthcare coverage, the problem
of catastrophic healthcare expenditure is of low priority
in Austria. The percentage of households with OOPP
Sanwald and Theurl International Journal for Equity in Health  (2015) 14:94 Page 10 of 12
shares above predefined income thresholds is not related
strongly to household ATP. Approximately 9 % of
households exceed the 2 % threshold, 4.3 % exceed the
5 % threshold, and 1.6 % exceed the 10 % threshold. We
expect this percentages to decrease if the accounting
period is increased.
2Households which have a negative ATP II are given
an ATP II of zero in the calculations.
3Pharmaceuticals consumed within inpatient treatment
are free for the patient. Their financing is included in
the DRG-based hospital financing system, and there is
no prescription fee.
4If the price of the pharmaceutical is below the
prescription fee, the patients pay the price of the
pharmaceutical.
5Exemptions are granted without application for (a)
retired people who draw small pensions from public
pension plans, (b) people with notifiable communicable
diseases, (c) members of the civilian service, including
their relatives, and (d) asylum seekers. On application,
exemptions from the prescription fees are granted for
insurance members (including co-insured household
members), each with a household net income below the
threshold values of the basic income maintenance system.
6If patients consume outpatient medical services sup-
plied by private physicians, pharmaceuticals are paid by
the public health insurance system on request, and the
system of prescription fees is applied in a similar way.
7Expenditure from OTC pharmaceuticals can result
from publicly or privately provided medical treatment.
Private health insurance plays only a very limited role in
financing pharmaceuticals.
8We abstain from showing the redistributive effects of
the OOPP category “other expenditure” because it includes
a heterogeneous mix of different expenditure items.
9Thereby, we are aware that in distributional matters,
the individual rather than the household is regarded as the
relevant unit and, correspondingly, individuals have to be
ranked in ascending order according to their household
ATP. This is analogous to weighting the household ATP
by the number of household members [29, 30].
10This result is in line with those of comparable
studies on the income distribution in Austria [27]
11Ungrouped data are needed for the decomposition of
RE into V, R, and H [20].
12The proportional cost sharing of members of the
health insurance for public workers, employers, and
farmers is excluded in this assessment.
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